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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The "Especially Heinous" Standard






Argued April 19, 1988
Cruelty and senselessness characterize all murder cases.
Most people would agree, however, that some murders are
more vicious and senseless than others. For the extreme
ases at either end of the continuum, a distinction is easy to
make. But between the extremes is a blurred middle. Some
states allow a death sentence where the murder was "espe-
cially heinous, atrocious or cruel." The question is whether
this standard gives the sentencer any real guidance In deter-
mining whether a murderer should die for a crime-or
whether it invites a capricious infliction of the death penalty.
ISSUES
The Supreme Court has been asked to decide whether a
state death penalty statute Is unconstitutionally vague in
characterizing an aggravating factor as a murder committed
In an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" manner. The
Court has been also asked to determine whether a death
sentence must automatically be vacated where the jury found
there was another valid aggravating circumstance.
FACIS
William Thomas Cartwright was tried in the District Court
of Muskogee, Oklahoma, for the first degree murder of Hugh
Riddle and the attempted murder of Riddle's wife, Charma.
The evening of the murder, the Riddles were watching
television. Charma Riddle walked down a hallway toward the
bathroom where she was confronted by Cartwright, a former
employee, who had somehow entered the home. Armed
with a shotgun, Cartwright shot her once in each leg. He
then went into the living room where he killed Hugh Riddle
with a single blast of the shotgun. In the meantime, Charma
Riddle crawled to a bedroom to summon help. Cartwright
found her there, told her that he had killed her husband
because they had fired him and then slit her throat. Charma
Riddle survived the assault and testified against Cartwright.
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The jury convicted him of the murder and the attempted
murder counts.
During the penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury
determined that there were two statutorily specified aggravat-
ing factors in this murder: 1) Maynard knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person, and 2) the
murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." Follow-
ing Oklahoma procedure, the jury weighed these aggravat-
ing factors against the mitigating factors offered by Cart-
wright and decided that he should die for murdering Hugh
Riddle.
Through a series of appeals, Cartwright brought his case
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which agreed to
decide the validity of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating circumstance. The court held that: 1) the
death sentence had to be vacated because it was based on a
constitutionally invalid aggravating circumstance; 2) the
Oklahoma courts failed to apply a constitutionally adequate
narrowing construction in this case, and 3) the federal court
hearing the appeal should not decide what narrowing con-
struction should be applied by the state of Oklahoma. The
Tenth Circuit vacated the death sentence and remanded the
case for a redetermination of the sentence (822 F. 2d 1477
(1987)).
The state of Oklahoma brought this matter to the Su-
preme Court for review.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In 1972, the Supreme Court effectively abrogated the
capital punishment procedures of thirty-nine states that gave
absolute discretion to the sentencer (judge or jury) to select
life Imprisonment or a death sentence (Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)). Most states immediately reenacted
capital punishment statutes that followed a variety of pat-
terns. The last sixteen years have been marked by a fierce
legal struggle in which opponents of capital punishment
have assailed the validity of these procedures In state and
federal courts. Several times, the Supreme Court has attempt.
ed to clarify Furman and balance the Constitution's toler-
ance of the death penalty with its demand that it be imple-
mented fairly and justly.
Four years after Furman, the Court held that the death
penalty must be implemented with procedures that guaran-
tee that the sentencer's discretion is "guided" and a death
sentence based on objectively defined and acceptable crite-
ria. The goal is to lessen the risks of "wholly arbitrary and
capricious actions" (Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
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Seeking to address these concerns, states enacted statutes
that attempted to channel the sentencer's discretion through
various procedural devices-such as statutes defining aggra.
vating and mitigating circumstances that characterize
murders.
Although the specifics vary greatly from state to state,
generally the intent was to enumerate aggravating circum-
stances that set certain murders apart from other murders. In
short, the idea was to distinguish the murders that call for the
death penalty from those that do not. This has been no easy
task. Such categorization of future murders uses general
language. This language has invited attacks that legislatures
have so broadly worded certain aggravating circumstances
that they fall to perform their function of objectively deter-
mining which murders are subject to the death penalty.
In Cartwright's case, the jury found that the murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The federal court of
appeals determined that this "especially heinous" factor,
which has been labeled the "standardless standard" by one
critic, failed to provide the sentencing jury with objective
guidance as to when to Impose the death penalty. The court
also observed that the Oklahoma courts had failed to provide
a sufficiently narrowing construction of this phrase that
might have tempered the statute's broad wording.
The Supreme Court's decision to review the adequacy of
the "especially heinous" aggravating circumstance will affect
not only the validity of the Oklahoma statute, but will also
have an Impact on about twenty other states that use similar
statutory language. Such concern Is evidenced by the amicus
brief in support of the statute submitted by the attorneys
general of fifteen states.
Many state authorities contend that the Constitution toler-
ates some subjectivity In sentencing and that lower federal
courts have overstepped their bounds In regulating state
criminal law. They also assert that the "especially heinous"
language Is sufficiently precise In that sentencers ought to be
allowed to consider the attitude of the killer, the manner of
the killing and the suffering of the victim when deciding
whether to impose the death sentence. In particular, the
Court has been asked to decide whether the "especially
heinous" standard requires proof that the victim suffered
physically before dying-or whether mental suffering may
be sufficient to warrant the death penalty.
Another issue potentially before the Court is more techni.
cal. It poses the problem of the validity of a death sentence
which is only partially based on an invalid aggravating
circumstance. The Supreme Court has addressed this ques-
tion under Georgia and Florida law and Indicated that such a
sentence might be valid under those statutory schemes.
However, Oklahoma's capital sentencing procedure Is differ-
ent from those in Georgia and Florida, so those earlier cases
might not control.
ARGUNMENT
For Gary D. Mayna4 The Rte of Oklaboma (Counsel of
Recort4 Robert H. Henry, 112 State Capitol Building Okla-
homa City, OK 73105; telephone (405) 521-3921)
1. Since the evidence was sufficient to support findings by
the jury and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that
the shotgun murder here was "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel," the death sentence should not be set
aside on the purported ground that the sentencer's discre-
tion was not adequately channeled by this sentencing
guideline.
A. The definition of "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" should not be limited to whether the victim has
suffered physical or mental torture. It Is appropriate
for the sentencer to consider the manner of the killing
and the attitude of the killer.
B. The requirement that the aggravating circumstance
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" be Interpret-
ed in a principled manner has no purpose since the
Court in other cases has approved aggravating circum-
stances that are more vague and because the sen-
tencer can also consider both nonstatutory aggravat-
ing circumstances and evidence of any mitigating cir-
cumstance.
2. The jury's finding of a second aggravating circumstance-
that Maynard knowingly created a great risk of death to
more than one person-genuinely narrowed the classes
of those eligible for the death sentence so that Imposing
it was constitutional.
For Wiam Thomas Carfwrgbt (Counsel of Record,
Mandy Welch, 1660 Cross Center Drive, Norman, OK 73019;
telepone (405) 325-3128)
1. The Eighth Amendment requirement that the states nar-
row the class of those eligible for the death sentence by
setting out clear and objective standards applies to Okla-
homa's use of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
cicumstance.
2. Oklahoma Ignores the court of criminal appeals' subse-
quent admission that Its construction of the "especially
heinous" circumstance in Cartwrght did not adequately
narrow the class of cases in which the death penalty may
be applied.
3. Oklahoma's complaints about the Tenth Circuit's opinion
are no more than thinly veiled expressions of dissatisfac-
tion with the narrowing requirements of the Eighth
Amendment.
AMICUS ARGUMENIM
In &"oft ofGaryD. Maynar
Alabama and fourteen other states (Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vir-
ginia and Wyoming) jointly filed a brief arguing that subjec-
tivity in sentencing is not unconstitutional and that the
"especially heinous" standard adequately channeled the
sentencer's discretion where the state appellate court set
guidelines for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
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